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Abstract
Multi-sided platforms are increasingly common,
which is no surprise given the winner-take-all
dynamics in platform-based markets. That is, the
platform with the biggest installed base of buyers and
sellers can arguably sustain its competitive advantage
because of positive indirect network effects. We
reexamine this argument with an agent-based
simulation model, where we allow for variety seeking
and probabilistic buyer affiliation with platforms and
interactions with sellers. Against the extant literature,
we show that incumbency advantage is more unlikely
to last when increasing the relative number of sellers
to buyers on the incumbent platform. This is because
extreme competition for buyers drives sellers and
hence buyers, because of positive indirect network
effects, to increasingly affiliate with the uncrowded
entrant platform. We thus add to the literature by
explaining how sustaining an installed base advantage
is contingent on avoiding overcrowding a platform
with too many sellers.

1. Introduction
Firms are increasingly operating multi-sided
platforms, where two or more different types of
customers are connected together to interact on a
common platform ([1], [2]). Examples include video
game consoles, PC operating systems, credit cards,
electronic marketplaces, social media sites, and so on
(for more examples, see e.g., [3]–[6]). Moreover,
operating such platforms can be highly beneficial to
focal firm performance; for example, some of the most
valuable firms on Earth have monetized through multisided platforms (e.g., Apple with iOS, Alphabet with
Google, Microsoft with Windows OS, Amazon.com
with its marketplace, and Facebook with the social
media platform). Unsurprisingly, multi-sided
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platforms are getting increasing attention from
strategic management scholars.
It has been argued that operating a multi-sided
platform can result in sustained competitive advantage
([7])—according to Van Alstyne et al. ([8], available
online): “Firms that fail to create platforms and don’t
learn the new rules of strategy will be unable to
compete for long”. This proposition is based on the
prevalence of positive indirect network effects in
platform-based markets ([9], [10]). They imply that a
bigger installed base of buyers and sellers to a platform
protects it from competitive entry (see also [11], [12]).
Thus, platform-based markets are also called winnertake-all markets where new buyers and sellers have
little reason to support nothing but the platform with
the biggest installed base of existing buyers and sellers
(see e.g., [3], [13]–[15]).
Despite the appeal of the winner-take-all
argument, platforms may also lose their market
leadership completely or share the market with entrant
platforms as observed in practice. Take for example
the rapid fall of Symbian OS and the rise of iOS—and
consider, on the other hand, that the other competing
platform Android did not completely take over iOS
either. Consequently, increasingly many scholars have
questioned the prevalence of indirect network effects
in explaining these unexpected and paradoxical
market outcomes of platform competition (see e.g. [4],
[16], [17]).
Whereas the preceding explanations on the
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition have
mostly centered on sufficient platform differentiation
([10]), in this paper we take another view. In
particular, we test whether an incumbent platform that
has the monopoly initially (i.e., all buyers and sellers
are affiliated the platform initially) will sustain its
market leadership when an identical platform enters
the market (e.g., with equal price and at similar
technological quality). In other words, we seek to
answer whether differentiating an entrant platform is
necessary to overcome incumbency advantages.
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By using agent-based modeling ([18]), we show
that an incumbent platform may lose its market
leadership to an undifferentiated entrant platform.
Specifically, the likelihood of disruption is shown to
be positively related to the relative number of sellers
to buyers on the incumbent platform, when assuming
buyers are variety seeking and act probabilistically
(see e.g., [19], [20]). Consequently, we add to the
literature on two- or multi-sided platforms ([1], [2]),
and platform-based markets ([4]), by elaborating on
how overcrowding a platform with too many sellers
can erode its competitive advantage (see e.g., [21]–
[23]).

2. Theoretical background
2.1. Multi-sided platforms
Multi-sided platforms are a novel organizational
form, where the focal firm facilitates interactions
between multiple types of customers affiliated with the
platform ([2]). That is, the distinctive feature of a
platform is that it does not directly interact with buyers
like, say, resellers do and that are the “twin”
organizational form to multi-sided platforms (for the
trade-offs in choosing between the two forms, see
[24]). Instead, a platform enables third-parties to
directly interact with each other on the common
platform, while capturing its share from third-party
interactions. Third-parties may include buyers and
sellers (but also, say, advertisers) that need to make
platform-specific investments in order to interact (i.e.,
they affiliate with the platform; see an in-depth
definition in [2, pp. 163–164]). To clarify, “affiliation”
may imply paying an access fee to the platform
whereas “interactions” between buyers and sellers
involve transactions. Figure 1 visualizes the structure
of a multi-sided platform.

Figure 1. Multi-sided platform (adapted from [2]).

For example, Amazon.com can be considered as a
multi-sided platform when it enables third-party
sellers to directly sell to buyers, in which case
Amazon.com charges commission fees from each
transaction. On the other hand, Amazon.com is not a
multi-sided platform but a reseller when it buys the

products or services from third-party sellers and then
sells them to buyers on its own (see e.g., [2, pp. 163–
165, 170–171], [25]). Another canonical example of a
multi-sided platform is a video gaming console, which
connects game developers and gamers, and these
platforms have attracted the most attention from
management scholars interested in multi-sided
platforms or platform-based markets (see e.g., [4],
[16], [17], [26], [27]). From the technological
perspective, marketplaces like Amazon.com are
obviously different to video game consoles—yet the
common denominating factor for the two is the multisided market structure.
Platform-based markets are often called winnertake-all markets, where only one platform may
dominate and sustain its market leadership (see e.g.,
[3], [13]–[15]). This is due to the prevalence of
positive indirect network effects ([28]–[30]); the
number of agents on one side of a platform tends to
positively affect platform demand on the other market
side(s), and vice versa ([2], [27]). As Hossain et al.
([10, p. 1913]; see also e.g., [9]) point out, “this is a
virtuous circle with increasingly many buyers and
sellers being attracted. This intuition, which is easily
formalized, suggests that tipping (i.e., all players
selecting the same platform) is an equilibrium in these
markets.” Reflecting back on Amazon.com as an
example, its ability to attract third-party sellers to the
platform has likely resulted in the consumers
substituting other resellers and platforms with
Amazon.com, and consequently more and more sellers
are coming on board. Thus, the installed base of buyers
and sellers have been referred to as important and
inimitable resources to platforms ([7], [26]), leading to
sustained competitive advantage (i.e., that a firm can
sustain above average performance in competition, see
e.g., [31], [32]).
According to the extant literature, the key to
leveraging indirect network effects is price structure
design ([1], [25], [33]–[35]). Simply put, aggressive
pricing strategies that aim for subsidizing one market
side usually result in getting them on board of the
platform, while the other market side can be charged
for above marginal cost prices due to indirect network
effects, even under platform competition ([36]–[38]).
For example, Amazon.com does not charge the buyers
for interactions, but the sellers pay the commission
fees. From the perspective of an entrant platform, it
has to arguably use penetration pricing in order to “get
big fast” (i.e., grow the installed base of buyers and
sellers rapidly in order to leverage network effects; see
e.g., [3], [17]). However, entrant platforms still face
the chicken-and-egg problem, where the sellers are
unwilling to come on board because of the lack of
buyers—or alternatively, buyers are unwilling to come
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on board because of the lack of sellers ([39]).
Therefore, an incumbent platform must not necessarily
cut prices to sustain market leadership because its
installed base advantage may be enough to mitigate
the aggressive pricing strategies of entrants.
In addition to pricing, platform differentiation also
explains platform competitiveness. A platform
differentiates primarily via the sellers; for example,
when it comes to video game consoles, game variety
and quality differentials between competing consoles
explain console sales ([17], [40], [41]). Especially the
non-technological platforms such as Amazon.com
depend mostly on third-party sellers in differentiating
the platform, because the other factors such as
technological quality of the platform are basically
irrelevant (see [4]). To clarify, in case of
Amazon.com, buyers need not to adopt a proprietary
technology to take use of the goods or services sold,
unlike when adopting, say, a video game console.
Sufficient platform differentiation may be the
primary reason for why we are not always observing
the winner-take-all outcome in platform-based
markets ([9], [10]). In other words, the literature is
rather consistent in predicting strong market
concentration in platform-based markets, when
platforms are undifferentiated but possess installed
bases of different sizes. This is distinctive from
traditional markets, where insufficient differentiation
tends to imply average performance (see e.g., [42],
[43]).

2.2. Overcrowding and competitive advantage
One concern for a platform with a big installed
base of sellers is overcrowding—meaning there are
too many sellers on the platform to sustain sufficient
performance for all sellers. Despite the expectation
that the installed base of buyers should compensate for
the negative effect of within-platform competition on
seller affiliation with the platform, overcrowding does
deter further affiliation of sellers ([21]–[23]). To
clarify, the “excess” sellers—who would be better off
in terms of performance in affiliating with the entrant
than the incumbent—leave the incumbent platform for
the entrant. Thus, overcrowding limits platform
growth and it could thus explain why no single
platform takes over the entire market (but still the
market would expectedly be concentrated to a degree).
However, a consequent effect due to the excess
sellers leaving the incumbent platform remains
unexplored. Here, we speculate that the excess sellers
leaving an incumbent platform may firstly trigger
further buyer affiliation with an entrant, and thus in
turn promoting the sellers who were better off in
affiliating with the incumbent in the first place to

affiliate with the entrant as well. Should these further
sellers affiliating with the entrant platform promote
further buyer affiliation as well, the demand growth
for the entrant platform becomes self-sustaining.
These self-sustaining demand dynamics could thus
erode the installed base of buyers and sellers of the
incumbent platform. In other words, overcrowding
could not only explain why platform-based markets do
not concentrate around one platform, but also the
oligopolistic market outcomes where undifferentiated
platforms compete head-to-head.
Some lonely buyers or sellers need to be affiliated
with the entrant platform initially, or that either of the
agents were forward-looking, so that the
aforementioned disruptive demand dynamics will be
triggered. Forward-looking sellers could perhaps
coordinate their support for the entrant platform in
order to trigger buyer affiliation. However, as
indicated in the preceding section, sellers tend to favor
platforms with more buyers. And even if there is some
evidence of forward-looking buyers (see e.g., [4], [9]),
it is doubtful that they could strategically coordinate
their support for the entrant platforms so as to trigger
seller affiliation. On the other hand, there is some
evidence in the literature that buyer affiliation
precedes seller affiliation to a platform ([44]). We
speculate that even if the buyers were not acting
strategically when supporting an entrant platform, they
could switch between competing platforms with
differently sized installed bases, because they seek
variety (see e.g., [45], [46]). Alternatively, borrowing
from the theory of probabilistic or stochastic choice
(see e.g., [20], [47], [48]), the installed base of sellers
to a platform may just increase the probability of buyer
affiliation. In other words, some buyers may
“accidentally” choose (i.e., against their expected
probabilistic choice) to affiliate with the entrant
platform with the installed base disadvantage or even
with no sellers. These accidental decisions may then
trigger even the non-probabilistically acting sellers to
increasingly favor the entrant platform.
In the following, we develop an agent-based model
with which we simulate competition between an
incumbent platform and an entrant, and examine the
effects of overcrowding to incumbency advantage.
Simulation methods are especially useful here, given
the lack of theoretical and consequently empirical
evidence on the hypothesized disruptive dynamics.
That is, simulation helps in solidifying our theoretical
understanding of an unexplored phenomenon, which
is also complex enough to necessitate more than
purely conceptual inquiry ([49], [50]). The next
section describes the model in detail.
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3. Methodology
3.1. General approach
We simulate competition between an incumbent
and an entrant platform, where the incumbent has an
installed base advantage. Given our explicit interest in
examining the effect of overcrowding to incumbency
advantage, it is necessary to control for the other
potential sources of platform competitive advantage.
Ideally, the two competing platforms would be
identical (e.g., they charge uniform prices, and they
are technologically similar), and that the sellers for the
platforms are also identical (e.g., they charge uniform
prices, and they sell similar products). Thus, the
buyers would be indifferent to choosing between the
competing platforms, except for that the installed base
of sellers on a platform positively affects buyer
affiliation. Consequently, if we were to observe that
the incumbent platform lost its dominant market
position to the entrant, it would necessarily be due to
the overcrowding effect that can ideally be controlled
exogenously (i.e., by controlling for the initial number
of buyers and sellers on the incumbent platform).
These aforementioned experimental conditions are
basically impossible to arrange in real platform-based
markets. Further, controlling for all relevant variables
that might confound the effects of overcrowding to
platform performance is also a non-trivial task (e.g.,
due to endogeneity arising from indirect network
effects). Our methodological choice, agent-based
modeling, is thus driven by the ease with which it is
possible to set up and simulate these experimental
conditions and thus examine an otherwise intractable
yet an important theoretical question ([49], [50]).
Moreover, it is necessary to use agent-based modeling
in particular, instead of other simulation methods,
because we assume variety seeking and probabilistic
choices of buyers; it implies that the platform
affiliation and seller interaction decisions of one buyer
may differ from those of another buyer even if their
expected choices were equal. To clarify further, it is
especially the seller interaction decisions of buyers—
that we assume to be positively affected by the
preceding number of buyers for sellers (the rationale
will be discussed in the model description)—that
necessitates simulating buyer/seller-level behavior.
The only simulation method that can account for these
“bottom up” demand dynamics is agent-based
modeling, where the decisions of agents are modeled
at the individual level instead of the aggregate level
such as in system dynamics ([18], [51], [52]).
1

To clarify, here we do not subscribe to the assumptions of expected
utility theory that assumes perfect rationality of buyers (see e.g.,

With regard to the assumptions of variety seeking
and probabilistic choice in particular, they reflect on
the bounded rationality of buyers, or even their
irrationality. It has been established long ago that real
economic agents do not conform to the behavioral
assumptions of rational choice models, such as
consistent preferences (see e.g., [53]). In fact, not only
buyers but also sellers are boundedly rational in
reality; for example, sellers may not perfectly
anticipate the relationship between their resources and
performance ([54]), which is also one of the grounding
assumptions of the resource-based view ([31], [32],
[55]). We thus assume variety seeking and
probabilistic choice of buyers, and also that the sellers
cannot perfectly anticipate buyer affiliation with
platforms. However, we still presume installed base is
the major determinant of affiliation. That is, we expect
buyers seeking variety only to a degree, and that most
of the time they would affiliate with the platform with
an installed base advantage. The same goes for sellers;
we assume they do not predict buyer affiliation, but
they simply tend to support the platform with the
biggest installed base as it is typically (but not always,
as will become evident) the one offering most utility
to them (see e.g., [22]).

3.2. The model
Formally, there are 𝑛𝑝 = 2 platforms, 𝑛𝑏 buyers,
and 𝑛𝑠 sellers in the platform-based market. At each
time step, the buyers and sellers will individually
decide on which of the two platforms to affiliate with.
Further, each buyer will also decide on whether and
with which seller to interact on the platform of choice.
Thus, buyers and sellers act at the same time when
affiliating with a platform. After affiliation, buyers
will also choose over the sellers on the platform, while
the sellers do not act anymore at the time step. This
execution structure of the model conforms largely
those of traditional game-theoretical models. Here, the
model will be executed repeatedly for a certain
number of time steps, and thus the behavior of agents,
most notably the platform affiliation decisions of
buyers and sellers (i.e., buyer and seller market shares
of the incumbent platform), can be observed over time.
The buyer’s expected utility from affiliating with a
platform or interacting with a seller corresponds to the
probability of choosing to affiliate with the platform
or interact with the seller.1 In other words, the
expected utilities of buyers range from [0,1], and the
greater the expected utility, the more likely it is that
the buyer will affiliate with a platform or interact with
[56], [57]). Instead, our utility formulae account for the variety
seeking and probabilistic behavior of buyers.
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a seller. Given we assumed platforms and sellers were
identical, buyer utilities can be represented as simple
functions of the installed bases, presuming each buyer
will choose to affiliate with a platform and possibly
interact with a seller at each time step.2 Thus, the
expected utilities (probabilities) 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡 ] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡 ]
of affiliation with a platform 𝑃 and interaction with a
seller 𝑆, respectively, to a buyer 𝐵 at time 𝑡 are
calculated as follows:
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
.
𝑛𝑠 + 𝑛 𝑝 𝛽

(1)

𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
.
𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡 𝛽

(2)

𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡 ] =
𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡 ] =

The 𝛽-terms in the equations 1 and 2 represent the
variety seeking behavior of buyers. That is, if 𝛽 = 0,
the buyers would not affiliate with a platform with no
preceding sellers, and also they would not interact with
a seller with no preceding buyers (i.e., the numerators
of the equations would always equal to zero). On the
other hand, the preceding buyers for a platform and a
seller do not solely determine further affiliation and
interaction decisions of buyers either, when 𝛽 > 0.
Then there is a chance that the buyers choose to
affiliate with another platform and interact with
another seller than would be expected by the preceding
number of users for the platform/seller (i.e., 𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1
and 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 are the number of buyers and sellers,
respectively, on a platform 𝑃 at time 𝑡 − 1, whereas
𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 is the number of preceding buyers for the
seller 𝑆 on a platform 𝑃 at time 𝑡 − 1).3 For simplicity,
we fix 𝛽 = 1 (i.e., it is a constant) in all simulations.

2

If a buyer affiliates with a platform and interacts with a seller at
each time step, it effectively means that they are willing to accept,
say, the prices of affiliation/interaction no matter what. Thus, given
the platforms and sellers are identical in terms of pricing (and other
aspects), the utility formulae need not to account for prices of
affiliation/interaction and the other aspects in which the buyers are
indifferent to choosing over platforms/sellers. However, the implicit
assumption here is that access fees, if greater than zero, are charged
on an ongoing basis (e.g., subscription pricing). Thus, our model is
more representative of platforms such as Amazon.com than, say, a
video game console where buyers need to buy the console (i.e.,
make an upfront investment that adds to the switching costs) before
interacting with sellers.
3
It is straightforward to verify that equation 1 sums up to 1 when
𝑛𝑝
summing over platforms (i.e., ∑𝑝=1
𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡 ] = 1). In other words,
the buyers will always choose to affiliate with a platform. However,
a buyer does not necessarily interact with a seller, except for when
the total interactions of sellers on the platform at time 𝑡 − 1 sum up
to the number of buyers on the platform at the time (i.e.,
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
∑𝑠=1
𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡 ] = 1, if ∑𝑠=1
𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 = 𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 ). Thus, a buyer
does not necessarily interact with a seller at a time step, if some

Thus, from the perspective of the incumbent platform
that will be having an initial installed base advantage
in the simulations, there is only a slight chance that the
buyers would seek variety by affiliating with the
entrant. Nevertheless, it will become evident that the
“accidental” entrant platform affiliation decisions of
buyers due to variety seeking and probabilistic choice
may trigger the self-sustaining demand dynamics
leading to the incumbent disruption—even if the
expected market share for the incumbent was close to
100 %, when 𝛽 = 1.4
On the other hand, a seller makes no probabilistic
platform affiliation decisions, yet their decisions are
positively affected by the installed base of buyers to
the platforms. Further, we assume that seller
interactions with buyers are positively affected by
their preceding interactions with buyers on a platform,
just as if platform affiliation is positively affected by
preceding affiliation. For example, in Amazon.com, a
buyer can observe the other buyers’ reviews of a seller
before making the decision to interact. Relatedly, it
has also been shown that the provision of “superstar”
or “hit” software is highly important to the associated
(e.g., gaming) platforms ([16], [40], [41]). Moreover,
we assume that sellers do not affiliate with multiple
platforms concurrently (see e.g., [37]), and that the
seller “reputation” due to preceding interactions with
buyers is non-transferable between platforms.
Whereas neither of the assumptions is likely to hold in
reality, here they are made primarily for simplicity.
Further, given sellers affiliate with one platform at a
time, the assumption of non-transferable reputation is
also more plausible because then a seller needs to
introduce itself to a “new” audience of buyers when
switching to another platform. Moreover, both
assumptions favor the incumbent platform, which is
somewhat sought after here in the sense that especially
sellers switched platforms or if the interactions are still “building
up” (i.e., when sellers have not interacted previously, as for example
when a platform enters the market).
4
It is straightforward to verify that the expected buyer (and hence
seller) market share of the incumbent platform decreases when 𝛽
increases. As an example, if 𝛽 = 1 and all 𝑛𝑠 = 100 sellers were
using the incumbent platform at time 𝑡 − 1 (i.e., no sellers were
using the entrant platform at the time), the expected buyer market
100+1
share for the incumbent platform at time 𝑡 is
≈ 0.9901.
100+2∗1
Similarly, if 𝛽 = 100, then the expected buyer market share is two
𝑛
+𝛽
thirds. One can analytically solve 𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 = 0.5 for β to find out
𝑛𝑠 +𝑛𝑝 𝛽

where disruption (of the buyers’ side) of the incumbent platform is
expected—for example, if 𝑛𝑝 = 2, it should be that 𝛽 =
1
∗𝑛 −𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
2 𝑠
1
1−2∗𝑛𝑝

1

=2

∗𝑛𝑠 −𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
1

1−2∗2

→ ∞, if the incumbent platform was

expectedly to be disrupted on the byers’ side of the platform at time
𝑡. Note that the formulation of equation 1 also explains why the
incumbent platform does not take over the entire market of buyers
initially, when the number of sellers on the platform is relatively low
(see the left hand side contour plots in Figure 2).
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in such hypothetical market conditions we would
expect the incumbency advantage to last (i.e.,
disproving this presumption would then be a strong
result). Finally, we assume that the sellers can
anticipate their interactions with buyers on a platform,
yet they cannot anticipate the number of buyers on the
platform. These latter assumptions are plausible in the
sense that sellers are more likely to anticipate their
own interactions than those of platforms (other than
retrospectively; see e.g., [22]). Also, given the implicit
assumption in the literature is that sellers cannot
coordinate their platform affiliation—but rather they
tend to be affiliated with the platform with the biggest
installed base of buyers, other things being equal—it
is even more expected that the sellers cannot anticipate
demand for the platforms.
Therefore, a seller chooses to affiliate with the
platform maximizing the following expected utility
formula (i.e., equation 3). We define the expected
utility 𝐸[𝑈𝑆𝑃,𝑡 ] of a platform 𝑃 to a seller 𝑆 at time 𝑡
as follows: 5
𝐸[𝑈𝑆𝑃,𝑡 ]

(3)

𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
= 𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 ∗
.
𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 𝛽
Finally, we impose all buyers and sellers to
affiliate with the incumbent platform (𝑝 = 1) at time
𝑡 = 0. Then, from time 𝑡 = 1 onwards, competition
between the incumbent platform and the entrant (𝑝 =
2) is simulated endogenously. The number of buyers
and sellers in the market are also controlled for
exogenously in the simulations—that is, 𝑛𝑏 =
[1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000],
and
𝑛𝑠 =
[1,2,3, … , 99,100], respectively. Due to the stochastic
nature of the model, for each parameterization it will
be simulated for 1000 iterations. In each iteration we
collect the market share data for every 250th time step
(i.e., at times 𝑡 = [0,250,500, … ]), and stop
simulations at time 𝑡 = 5000.
All in all, the present model is arguably very
simplistic, while still capturing the essentials of buyer
and seller affiliation/interaction processes (i.e., direct
and indirect network effects). It enables us to easily
5

Note that the second term in the equation 3 corresponds largely to
the utility formula of buyers (i.e., equation 2). However, the sellers’
anticipation of future sellers on a platform (i.e., 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 ) is based on
the preceding number of sellers on the platform, whereas the buyers
observe the actual number of the sellers on the platform after
platform affiliation.
6
The model was implemented in AnyLogic 7.1.2
(www.anylogic.com).
7
Here, any sustained market share difference in favor of the
incumbent platform implies its competitive advantage. The
confidence intervals were calculated based on the non-parametric

evaluate the effects of overcrowding to incumbent
platform competitive advantage by varying the
number of buyers and sellers on the platform and
observing the resulting market share outcomes over
time. Note that there is no predetermined ratio of
sellers to buyers on a platform that implies
overcrowding—instead,
overcrowding
emerges
endogenously in the model, or not. We will see
whether it does in the following section.6

4. Results
To evaluate the effects of overcrowding to the
sustained competitive advantage of the incumbent
platform, Figure 2 indicates the median buyer and
seller market shares of the incumbent platform with
respect to the number of buyers and sellers in the
market (or alternatively, on the incumbent platform, as
all buyers and sellers affiliate with it initially), and also
with respect to time. Note that each subplot is 3dimensional, where the contours represent the market
shares of the incumbent platform with respect to the
parameters. To clarify, the upper left and right contour
plots in Figure 2 represent the median buyer and seller
market shares respectively and at time 𝑡 = 5000 (i.e.,
at the last simulated time step). Analogously, the lower
left and right contour plots represent the buyer and
seller market shares respectively and over time, when
the number of buyers in the market 𝑛𝑏 = 1000.
Most notably, the hatched areas in each contour
plot (Figure 2) indicate the range of parameters where
disruption of the incumbent platform is observed. In
other words, in these areas, the lower bound of the
confidence interval (at 𝛾 = 0.95 confidence level) for
the median market share in either side of the
incumbent platform is equal to or lower than 50 %.7
One can easily see from the upper left and right
contour plots (Figure 2) that the incumbent platform is
more likely to lose its market leadership until the time
𝑡 = 5000, when the relative number of sellers to
buyers in the market increases. For example, when
𝑛𝑏 = 1000, the incumbent platform loses its market
leadership approximately when 𝑛𝑠 > 20 until the time
𝑡 = 5000. The pace of disruption is also positively
bootstrap using 1000 bootstrap samples. Bootstrapped estimates
tend to be asymptotically consistent and unbiased regardless of the
underlying distribution of data ([58]), which is very useful because
simulation models can easily produce non-normally distributed data
(this is also the reason for measuring the median market shares
instead of means) ([59]). Further, it is practically impossible to
check for the distribution of data in each of the many
parameterizations, and hence bootstrapping is basically a panacea in
analyzing stochastic simulation data.
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Figure 2. Median buyer (left) and seller (right) market shares of the incumbent platform with respect to the
number of buyers and sellers in the market (upper), and with respect to time (lower). The hatched areas
indicate the range of parameters where disruption of the incumbent platform is observed.

related to the relative number of sellers to buyers in the
market (lower left and right contour plots). For
example, when 𝑛𝑏 = 1000 and 𝑛𝑠 = 100, the two
platforms tend to share the buyers and sellers equally
approximately when 𝑡 > 500. One can also see from
the left and right hand side contour plots that the
disruption occurs rather uniformly on both sides of the
platform.
Thus, it seems that the random events where some
buyers “accidentally” affiliate with the entrant
platform (i.e., against their expected probabilistic
choice) are more likely to trigger further buyer and
seller affiliation, leading to the self-sustaining
disruptive demand dynamics, when the incumbent
platform is overcrowded with too many sellers. In
other words, the accidental affiliation of buyers is
significantly more unlikely to trigger the selfsustaining disruptive demand dynamics, when the
relative number of sellers to buyers on the incumbent
platform stays at a relatively low level.8

5. Discussion

8

happen eventually. Due to computational limitations, we did not
simulate the entire parameter space for a longer period of time than
what was presented above. The present observation was based on
test simulations with some selected parameters.

In fact, if the simulation model is run for long enough (e.g., tens or
hundreds of thousands of time steps), the disruption seems to occur
eventually, no matter what. However, it does not invalidate the
aforementioned results, as it only tells us that the unlikely events can

5.1. Theoretical implications
Multi-sided platforms are increasingly prevalent,
and some of the most valuable firms on Earth (e.g.,
Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon.com, and
Facebook) operate them. This might not be a
coincidence as platform-based markets are arguably
characterized of winner-take-all dynamics. That is, the
platform with the biggest installed base of buyers and
sellers should sustain market leadership and basically
take over the entire market, because of the prevalence
of positive indirect network effects in platform-based
markets ([9], [10], [13]–[15]). Thus, multi-sided
platforms are becoming the next major organizational
form of interest to strategic management scholars
seeking to explain sustained competitive advantage
([1]–[4], [8]). Despite their appeal, however, several
empirical examples illustrate how platforms cannot
sustain their market leadership or how multiple
platforms can compete head-to-head in platform-based
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markets. Thus, the intuitively sound winner-take-all
argument is clearly lacking in empirical validity.
In this paper, we joined the critiques who have
questioned the installed base of buyers and sellers to a
platform being strategic resources, explaining
sustained competitive advantage ([7], [31], [32]).
Whereas the preceding explanations on the
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition have
mostly centered on sufficient platform differentiation
(see e.g., [4], [16], [17], [40]), we took another view,
however. We were particularly interested in exploring
whether an incumbent platform with an installed base
advantage may lose its market leadership to an entrant
that has no preceding users and is completely
undifferentiated from the former. By using agentbased modeling ([18]), we showed that random and
unlikely events may trigger the self-sustaining demand
dynamics that lead to the erosion of incumbent
platform competitive advantage due to indirect
network effects. Importantly, we showed how the
likelihood of the disruptive demand dynamics being
triggered is positively related to the relative number of
sellers to buyers on the incumbent platform.
We thus add to the literature on two- or multi-sided
platforms ([1], [2]), and platform-based markets ([4]),
by illustrating how the sustained competitive
advantage of a platform due to indirect network effects
is
contingent
on
avoiding
overcrowding.
Overcrowding occurs when there are too many sellers
on a platform to sustain sufficient performance for all.
To the best of our knowledge—even if the extant
literature acknowledges within-platform competition
is detrimental to platform performance in the sense
that it deters further seller affiliation ([21]–[23])—
there are no existing studies explicating how
overcrowding can trigger the disruptive competitive
dynamics from the incumbent platform’s perspective.
By showing that the installed base advantage can
erode “itself”—in other words, sellers may
increasingly exit an overcrowded platform when more
favorable platform options are available—we thus
offer an important contribution to the literature that
tends to picture the installed base as an inimitable and
hence as a strategic resource to platforms ([7], [31],
[32]). All in all, our results suggest that the
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition may
simply be attributable to the lack of differentiation
between platforms (see also e.g., [16]). In other words,
sufficient platform differentiation may not be needed
to overcome installed base advantages, as the sellers
might naturally support an undifferentiated entrant
platform in order to mitigate the direct negative
network effects (i.e., within-platform competition).
Importantly, even if we assumed variety seeking
(see e.g., [19], [45], [46]) and probabilistic platform

affiliation and seller interaction decisions of buyers
(see e.g., [20], [47], [48]), it does not imply that the
market outcomes would be random as well. That is,
the “accidental” (i.e., unexpected) entrant platform
affiliation decisions of buyers were significantly more
unlikely to trigger the self-sustaining disruptive
demand dynamics in the simulations, when the relative
number of sellers to buyers on the incumbent platform
was sufficiently low. Thus, there is some validity to
the winner-take-all argument. However, given the
prevalence of positive indirect network effects that the
winner-take-all argument builds on, more and more
sellers should affiliate with the “winners”. It is thus a
theoretically intriguing (yet practically devastating)
idea that positive indirect network effects may
eventually drive the winners to become “too big to
fail”, no matter what, thus eroding their installed base
advantage.

5.2. Managerial implications
The simple message of this research to
practitioners is that overcrowding a platform with too
many sellers should be avoided, or more generally that
platforms should not exert their monopoly power over
sellers “in full” (see e.g., [37]), because otherwise
platform competitiveness may be hurt. Avoiding
overcrowding is essentially about balancing the
number of agents on each side of the platform, so that
the sellers can enjoy sufficient performance and thus
remain affiliated with the platform. One way to do this
is to ensure platform growth on both sides of the
platform. However, this may be hard in practice—if
we think of the most valuable platforms today, such as
Apple’s iOS, the industry sources have indeed
reported that the “gold rush” is over and sellers face
intense competition on the platform. We would thus
expect some sellers withdrawing from iOS to
competing platforms, where competition is not so
extreme—one possible explanation to the success of
Android is that competition among sellers is not as
extreme on the platform as it is on iOS. In these cases,
restricting platform growth may be required to balance
the market sides of the platform.
While we have not examined the strategies of
platform owners to prevent overcrowding, there may
be some. For example, platform owners could increase
prices to sellers in order to deter further entry to the
platform (i.e., to deter within-platform competition).
However, such a strategy is risky, because then the
entrant platforms may more easily utilize, say,
penetration pricing to overcome incumbency
advantages. Another strategy, as pursued by Apple,
may be to adopt strict quality standards for sellers.
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This strategy may also enable platform differentiation
in terms of quality.

5.3. Limitations and future research
There are some limitations in the present study.
First, the agent-based model is highly simplistic, thus
limiting the generalizability of results. For example,
disruption due to overcrowding may be less common
when platform switching costs are high as they were
now basically ignored in the model. Thus, future
research may empirically validate the theoretical
findings and explore boundary conditions.
Second, we assumed buyers were seeking variety
and choosing probabilistically between competing
platforms and sellers. Should the reader accept these
assumptions, they are not a limitation, however (see
e.g., [53]). Nevertheless, it would still be interesting in
the future research to explore whether the disruptive
demand dynamics due to overcrowding occur in a
deterministic world where buyers are rational. In
particular, one could elaborate on the conditions when
the forward-looking behavior of buyers (and/or
sellers) could make them strategically support entrant
platforms.
Moreover, we did not allow for the platforms to
adapt to the changing market conditions in terms of,
say, pricing. One could thus expand the analysis to
account for and analyze the effectiveness of strategies
(e.g., pricing) that platforms can use to counteract
seller exits and hence the disruptive demand
dynamics. Finally and relatedly, we imposed
overcrowding by controlling for the number of buyers
and sellers on the incumbent platform exogenously.
One could instead endogenously model the entry of
sellers to the platforms in order to understand what
drives overcrowding and evaluate the platform
strategies to prevent it in the first place.
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